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the validity and reliability of expert knowledge, in that they concerned the failure of demographic calculations and economic forecasting to accurately predict increased life expectancies and correlated balances of social security programmes. In the last section of the chapter, I suggest that this recognition of the epistemic but unstable underpinning of the 'ageing society' served as the context to re-build a research agenda for the 'ageing society' from the 1980s to the present day.
Ageing society at the turn of the 21st Century
Since the turn of the century, the 'ageing society' has come of age. This transition was marked by a variety of national and global organisations identifying population ageing as one of the main challenges faced by humanity, along with climate change. The tone was perhaps laid by the United Nations 'International Year of Older Persons ' in 1999, which, under the theme of the age-inclusive society, marked a shift in ageing policies. Policy markers declared that whereas previous programmes were 'focusing upon a static age group apart from the rest of the population, efforts [were then being] made to view aging as merely one stage in the course of individuals' lives' (Kalache and Kickbusch, 1997:4 ) . This meant that programmes should emphasise the commonalities and interdependencies between older people and the rest of society rather than single out a specific group. In that same year, the European Commission organised a series policy conferences on 'active ageing' that also proposed an abandonment of the idea of 'the elderly' as a fixed group (Avramov and Maskova, 2004) . This political orientation became later crystallised in a comprehensive approach to ageing through a coordination of 'mutually reinforcing policies' to tackle 'the economic, employment and social implications of ageing'. (EC 2002:5) Ageing was no longer a concern for older people alone.
Indeed, in these policy statements, it is not difficult to identify an emerging consensus about the need to depart from the idea that the 'problems of ageing' belonged solely to the elderly. While acknowledging the significance of the challenge brought to bear by One relates to the scale of the 'community' that is seen to be affected by demographic ageing. It is not only that the consequences of ageing are society as a whole, but also that this society is now conceived a global entity. According to the same report, although mostly associated with the developed world, demographic ageing is occurring fastest in the developing world. This process, it is argued, further reinforces social, economic and technological inequalities between the Global North and South, as developing countries are growing old before they become rich (Kalache, Barreto and Keller, 2005) . Linking the 'ageing society' with the dynamics of the global economy also problematized the ways in which demographic ageing had been framed and managed within national boundaries, and motivated the need to "emphasise the power of knowledge as a policy tool" (Olshanky et al, 2011) . This is linked to second dimension of the UN statement.
In a context of global ageing, policy makers argued, it was necessary to create the right epistemic infrastructure to make the implications of the ageing society visible, tangible and actionable. Thus, in Ban Ki-Moon's statement, the link between the individual case and the 'wider society' is tellingly described as 'touching', to connote the fragile, almost imperceptible connection between the two. The difficulty with understanding the 'ageing society' was then more related to the fact that it was not available to immediate experience, to the 'naked eye', so to speak. To realise the link between individual experience of ageing Mostly dealing with what is commonly known as 'facts and figures', the report thus neatly identifies the knowledge domains pertaining to the ageing society: the knowledge of population dynamics (demography), public finances, labour market economics, health and social care, and the socio-economic relations between age groups. One of the most striking aspects of this list is the weight of economic aspects of the ageing society: resources, demand, labour force, markets, budgets, fiscal systems. The report proposes that there is a relationship between the factual reality of population ageing, of the increased proportion of older people in the European population, and the hard reality of economics, of money, markets and budgets. This bond is further evinced in the following graph, Taken from a presentation by Fritz von Nordheim at a European Active Ageing Conference in December 2012, the graph represents the current and future age pyramid for the 27 countries of the European Union. The age pyramid is a commonly used bilateral histogram that divides the population into gender and age cohorts (See Chpt 4). It main advantage in comparison with tabular distributions of age groups is that, by its shape alone, it provides the viewer an assessment of the age structure 'at a glance'. Usually, pyramids with larger bases are seen to represent growing, 'younger populations' while constricted pyramids are seen to belong to populations in decline.
In the example provided, to this demographic assessment is added an economic qualification of the population, whereby in each age cohort are nested calculations of the proportions of the active and inactive members of each age group. In the graph, Nordheim, a social scientist specialising in European welfare systems, known for his policy work in the Employment and Social Affair domain, brings the two dimension of the 'ageing society' in together. On the one hand, looking at the outlines of the two pyramids, we are able to observe that the European population is expected to age considerably in the next four decades, as the older age groups become more prominent. On the other hand, looking within the age group bars, we become aware of distributions of working capacity within the population between those actively working (yellow), those unemployed but capable of working (grey), those incapable of working (red). From this we quickly glean a relative One way of tracing the evolution of these transfers as an aggregate is known as the dependency ratio, which calculates the relationship between active members of the population and those receiving any transfer in the form of education, welfare, pensions, etc.
While the most widely used dependency ratio includes both individuals bellow and above 'working age' (15-16 and 65 years), in the context of demographic ageing, experts tend to use the more specific 'old age dependency ratio', which equates only person aged 65 or more in relation to people of working age. On the basis of these premises, Eurostat calculates that in 2010 there were almost 4 persons of working age for every older person (26%), and projects that in 2060 this ratio will be closer to 2/1 (50%) (Eurostat, 2012: 32).
Nordheim's graph above builds on these figures to calculate an even more detailed ratio between population not in the labour force and those actively working: the economic dependency ratio. This more specific ratio attempts to shifts the focus from chronological age to the actual working population, regardless of age (See Chpt 5). Curiously, however, instead of projecting a dramatic increase in the dependency ratio in 2050, as the Eurostat proposes for the old-age related calculation, the economic dependency ratio is only expected rise about a quarter in the next four decades. This is because Nordheim's projection is based on the realisation of adequate pension reforms in the EU member states prior to 2020 -an imagined possibility known as the "EU 2020plus scenario" -whereby there is a consistent postponement of retirement mirroring life expectancy, health and functionality gains in the population (See Chpt 7). Outline of a genealogy of the 'ageing society'
To understand the question posed in the previous section, it is necessary, I suggest, to grapple with the key element of the 'ageing society': its population dynamics. In other words, the ageing society is above all a 'population problem'. In his theorisation of governmentality, Foucault describes a contrast between two regimes of power-knowledge and forms of security. In sovereign-type States, territorial authority emanates directly from a central ruler, deployed through strategic knowledge about 'enemies'. In liberal, governmentalized States, power is reliant instead on knowledge and management of populations. Defined as "a global mass affected by overall pressures of birth, death, production, illness" (Foucault, 2003:243) , the population is understood through a series of 'dispositifs' focusing on these aspects of the 'mechanics of life'. In particular, it is contingent on the application of methods of data formatting and procedures of statistical analysis that render such mechanisms visible. Of significant relevance, in view of how the implications of the ageing society are imagined by key policy institutions such as the UN, is Foucault's suggestion these that mechanisms are "aleatory and unpredictable when taken in themselves or individually, but which, at the collective level, display constants that are easy, It is somewhat surprising that Foucault linked scarcity with disciplinary power rather than biopolitical power, given his interest in the development of actuarial science. In his view, "insurance or regularizing technology" was central to the apparatus of governmentality (Foucault, 2003: 222) , the notion of population being founded on the epistemological assumption that it possessed its own regularities, "its number of dead, its number of sick, its regularity of accidents" (Foucault, 2009: 107) . For Foucault, governmentality was underpinned by "the absolutely capital concept […] of risk" (Foucault, 2009: 87; Ewald, 1991) . As is well recognised, one of the central techniques of capturing these regularities and risks is the life table. This is a tabulation that shows, for each age, the probability of death within a year. It is a fundamental tool both in classical actuarial science, enabling the calculation of insurance rates, and in demography, to determine age-specific life expectancy -and, through this, to make predictions of future age structures, such as the EU27/2050 discussed above.
The importance of the Malthusian 'population problem' in both actuarial science and demography is embodied in Gomperz' Law of Mortality. Gompertz, a practicing actuary working for Select Parliamentary Committees on Friendly Societies in the 1820s, proposed that mortality rates increase in a logarithmic progression (Gompertz, 1825; Kirkwood, 2015) .
Gomperz' law is interesting because he decomposed death in two categories: those caused by chance, which would act in a constant, linear manner; and those caused by 'deterioration, or an increased inability to withstand destruction' (Gompertz, 1825: 517).
Chance death could be seen as representing a normalising transformation of the arithmetic rate governing food production in Malthus' model, in that it replaced the catastrophic 'checks' on population growth by famine and disease (Dean, 2015) , by a smooth, unceasing force. Although chance death was excluded in Gompertz' equation -later reintegrated by
Mackeham -his technique enabled a calculation of 'life contingencies' that quickly became part of the standard toolkit used by insurance companies. This practice routinely attributed a monetary value -a worth -to a specific age. (Thane, 2000: 194) . These reforms, much swayed by Gomperz' work for the Parliamentary Committee (above), required that credentialised actuaries be responsible for the setting of annuities in the Societies. This embedding of actuarial expertise on the cooperative insurance sector aimed to create the tools for incentivising thrift in the emerging industrial labourer population. In this respect, Gompertz' division between chance death and deterioration formalised in actuarial classification the progression from 'savage life' -ensnared by the accidental -to 'civilised life' -characterised by planning and restraint -that is at the heart of Malthus theory of population (Malthus, 1792; Tellman, 2013; Dean, 2015) . Indeed, in Gompertz' original paper, accidental and unavoidable death co-existed in his analysis of existing life tables (Hooker, 1965) , but the latter modelled the unadulterated process of ageing and death. Given Gompertz admiration for Newton, it can be said that approximation to this ideal was not only closer to natural truth but also to ideal moral worth.
Efforts to professionalise the Friendly Societies insurance schemes continued through the 19 th century. They were particularly boosted by the introduction of the first old age pension programme by Bismarck in 1889, which campaigners contrasted with the inadequacies of the Poor Law and Friendly Societies in providing for older people in Britain (Thane, 2000: 198-199 
Re-inventing the ageing society
A genealogical exploration of the ageing society clarified how it belongs to the set of population problems enacted by liberal biopolitical regimes. In this process, ageing became a key articulation of the relationship between mechanisms of life and the economy, embodied in the practices of actuarial science. As these were incorporated in the administration of populations by the implementation of old age pensions, it made the collection of data about age, and 'old age' in particular a key activity of emerging welfare states. But these components are not enough to elucidate fully how the 'ageing society' 'gathered as a thing' a few decades later. In the first section, we suggested that ageing society also assembles when the underlying -actuarial -assumptions of programmes such as pension schemes, and health and social care financing are challenged by the process of demographic ageing. The ageing society is, to put it simply, a difference between the actuarial forecast and the contemporaneous reality of the population. This, I will suggest in 
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• an ever-shifting agenda of related public policy issues.
(Committee on an Aging Society,1985: ii)
One of the striking aspects of this list is its similarity with the EU description of the consequences of the ageing society three decades later, in the other side of the Atlantic.
Indeed, the US Committee can be said to have laid the foundations of policy framing of the ageing society. These foundations relied, as one would expect, on a historically amassed collection of forms of knowledge about the ageing process brought to bear by the advent of While the implementation of this ideal was fraught with difficulties in the next decades (Achenbam, 1995) , it is undeniable that it served to frame the composition of the US Committee on an Aging Society, which included physician-scientists -the Nobel-prize winning virologist and paediatrician, Frederik C. Robbins -economists, actuaries, epidemiologists, social scientists but also architects, occupational therapists and lawyers.
The remit of the Committee was to collect, review and assess the 'state of knowledge' relating to specific areas of concern, such as productivity of older people, health, and the built environment. In so doing, they gathered together the various programmes of ageing research that had been sparked by the Woods Hole conference to examine the present and future of the ageing society. From this perspective, it is significant that the committee's assessment of this corpus of knowledge is saturated with uncertainty, the nature of the 'ageing society' itself not 'being entirely clear'. (Serow and Sly, 1988 :43) Casting research on the demography of ageing as 'relatively recent vintage', Serow and Sly provide an overview of the complex set of variables that enable a calculation of the changing relative size of 'old age' cohorts. Added to this complexity is the sense that the quality of the data and of the techniques used to compute demographic forecasts are uncertain, questioning whether "the knowledge provided by the demography of aging can help policymakers" (Serow and Sly, 1988: 43) . Such a precautious assessment of the capacity of demography to produce accurate and reliable forecasts contrasts with the epistemic authority it emanated within earlier welfare 'insurance societies'. What we encounter instead is a situation where it is 'important to know much more' than previously thought.
The lack of confidence in demographic forecasts is less surprising if we consider that Serow and Fly were writing just a few years after the 'social security crisis' of the turn of the 1980s.
This event had publicly questioned the actuarial assumptions upon which old age pensions and other programmes had been established. Kenneth Manton, a prominent US demographer who was a central figure in the public debates on this 'social security crisis', recalls the processes as such:
Before the implications of U.S. population aging became nationally visible in the Social
Security "crisis " of 1982 and 1983, there Manton, 1991: 311) . Such prediction was underpinned by the view that increases in life expectancy had been driven by changes in child health and survival at early ages, but that these gains in life expectancy would not be reflected in the size older cohort because of combination of the arch of development and old age, and a natural 'limit' in human longevity.
Breaking this consensus entailed re-examining the relationship between mortality and morbidity -the quantity and quality of life. In 1980, Fries had strongly reinforced the mainstream view by proposing that gains in prevention of illness would lead to a 'compression of morbidity' against a limit of longevity (Fries, 1980; Fries and Crapo, 1981) .
This would approximate the curve of mortality to the 'ideal' proposed by Gompertz (above).
It also promised a world where, by preventative medicine, time spent living with chronic disease was much reduced. Manton himself had been pivotal in questioning this scenario by arguing that while morbidity might increase in older cohorts, its severity on average would be reduced, leading to gains in life expectancy (Manton, 1982 60 nothing more than to extend the number of years older people experienced disability (Schneider and Brody, 1983) .
In this respect, the controversy was compounding the sense of uncertainty that emerged from the public realisation that 'official projections had received inadequate scientific input'. It was not only that demographic and actuarial calculations became publicly deemed uncertain, it was also that experts could not agree on the instruments and measurements that should be used to evaluate the consequences of 'demographic ageing' on the public purse and the tax payer. It is from this perspective that we can read Serow and Fly's irresolute review of the demographic of ageing. There were observable uncertainties not only about the knowledge base for decision-making but also about the institutional character of knowledge-making procedures: was the administrative apparatus of the State adequate for collecting data related such a complex, unstable object as ageing?, did actuaries, demographers and epidemiologists have the right tools to understand agespecific life expectancy or morbidity?, was there enough funding to understand the 'fixed'
and malleable aspects of age-related illness?
A similar 'knowledge crisis' was also emerging in the United Kingdom. Like in the United
States with the Reagan administration, Britain had elected a few years earlier a government that wanted to promote economic prosperity through market-driven reforms and restructuration of public services, including pensions. In this context, the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), an independent think-tank concerned with the financial basis of state administration and social and economic policies, conducted a wide-ranging review of the social security system. Departing from the proposition that "Social Security is 'another (Dilnot, Kay and Morris, 1984: 12-13) While just focusing on social security, and thus concerned with morbidity and chronic disease in the report, Dilnot and his colleagues could still link the problems experienced by the social security system to weakness in actuarial and demographic forecasts. In the British case, this was not only linked to the fact that the population of pensionable age grew proportionally more than expected, it was also that, because of this relative imbalance, those contributing to the scheme were less than would have been ideal. In other words, the IFS was suggesting that because of this statistical relationship between active and nonactive populations, the system was not sustainable. This assessment is usually linked to cutbacks on the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) by the conservative government in 1986 (MacNicol, 2015: 56).
As it should be apparent by now, we can take the various elements of these 'social security crises' as the model and the origin of the 'ageing society'. Seen from this perspective, the 'ageing society' is less about the societal consequences of population ageing, and instead should be viewed as knowledge-related problem. The 'ageing society' stands for a concern with 'knowledge reflexivity', where there is increased, widespread awareness of the uncertainty of the knowledge base upon which key social and welfare institutions rely. In this respect, the 'ageing society' can be seen as part of a wider transformation in contemporary societies in their institutional framing of knowledge processes.
In sociology, these transformations are mainly associated with the emergence of what Beck (1986) labelled the 'risk society'. Beck, drawing on Luhman and Ewald, proposed that members of the 'risk society' experienced a paradoxical combination of increased public awareness of technological, man-made risks and a recognition of depending on the same forms of scientific knowledge to assess, and of technological innovation to solve such risks.
However, our analysis shows that, in the case of the 'ageing society', it is those technologies of risk assessment and control of contingencies that become problematized. The 'ageing society' appears at the confluence of failed past actuarial assumptions and the need to re- Lacoumes and Barthe, 2009: 18) . 
Re-imagining ageing
Recasting the crisis of the 'insurance society' as a crisis of knowledge provides a scaffold to explore the nexus between ageing and technoscience. If the 'insurance society' had relied on and reinforced models of ageing that enacted 'old age' as biological, psychological and socio-economic stage in life (Katz, 1996) , for which specific welfare programmes were required, the 'crisis of social security' was underpinned by opening up established knowledge on age-related functional decline, disability and life expectancy. As we will see in the remaining chapters of this book, this problematisation did not begin de novo in these years, but was instead a parallel formatting of the ageing process, which controversies on aiming to coordinate all nationally funded ageing research, the NIA had been set up to provide 'a comprehensive investigation of the normal, physiological changes with age' (Butler, 1977: 8) . As we will see in Chapter 6, the idea of 'normal ageing' had been proposed as a conceptual device to imagine a distinction between avoidable and unavoidable morbidity and disability associated with ageing. Knowing and establishing such 'standard' was seen to be a powerful alternative to the 'arbitrary' age limit for work, retirement and health care entitlement (Chapter 5 (Butler 1982:vi) Butler explicitly describes the 'social security crisis' as a period of heightened uncertainty and controversy over retirement age and its relationship with function. His view is that the problematisation of age graded programmes justifies and motivates a research programme on 'the impact of aging on human performance'. Like Manton, Butler proposed that the key consequence of such debates is a focused research agenda on ageing and dis/ability, to establish what can be legitimately be asked and provided to older people. In so doing, he postpones the collective decision of rising the retirement age, and hinges such choice on future technoscientific research and innovation, a future he hoped would be shaped by the activities of the NIA.
A similar type of imaginary supported attempts to re-organise ageing research in Europe. In
France, where neoliberal models had less bearing, the emerging uncertainties about life expectancy and malleability of health and functionality in 'old age', most visible in the work of Francois Bourliere, justified the creation of the Unite the Recherches Gerontologiques within the Institut National de la Sante et Recherche Medicale (Lenoir, 1979) . In Britain, questions about extended age specific life expectancy and the role biomedicine in this were also central to renewed discussions regarding the -ultimately failed -creation of a NIA-like institute in the United Kingdom (MRC archives). Second, were issues to do with 'healthy ageing' and how it related to biomedical intervention and public health measures. The third concerned 'ensuring enabling and supportive environments' -physical and social -for active and healthy ageing.
It is possible to think of these three areas as being related through a loosely coupled triangle. To think the 'health' axis, we might want to emphasise how practices of health , and how this might, in some instances, be configured as forms of biocapital (Rose, 2009; Cooper, 2011) . Taking work and activity as a point of entry would entail exploring how re-evaluations of the value of labour and its relation with ageing are entangled with health production, on the one hand, and 'supportive environments', on the other (see Chpt 7).
Focusing on technology requires, in the first instance, understanding how through epidemiology and health research relations previously labelled as 'social' -families, friendships, meals, etc. -become qualified as salutary or prejudicial, leading to attempts to instrumentalise and manipulate them. This extension of the range of techniques or interventions blurs, in the case of ageing, the distinctions between biomedicine and public health that have prevailed in other domains (Butler et al, 2008 ; also Chpt 9).
Technoscientific promises in the domain of ageing offer to modify health and work through a set of converging tools and forms of knowledge that range from the molecular to the sociological.
From this perspective, the 'ageing society' is an assemblage that constrains uncertainties brought to bear with the crisis of actuarial projections. It can be thought of as a way of framing the organisation of knowledge production, technological development and policy formulation that is required by the indeterminate future the 'ageing society' formulates. A measure of its pervasiveness is the fact that the debate between pessimistic and optimistic takes on demographic ageing hinge on differences on the extent and character of the relationship between health, work and technology, and their consequences for economic policy. Further, an indication of its stability as a mode of organising the nexus of ageing and technoscience is that it has remained more or less unchanged for the last three decades. To understand what enabled and sustained the 'ageing society' gathering into a thing, it is necessary to look deeper into the various components within each of the triangular relationship. This will be the main aim of the following chapters.
